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National Defense University, USA
Introduction
On October 21, 2010, the Chinese Government blocked exports to Japan 
of an economically vital category of minerals, rare earth elements (REE), 
used in high technology production.1 The move followed Premier Wen 
Jiabao's demand for the release of the Chinese fishing trawler captain 
detained by Japan in disputed waters after the boat collided with two Jap-
anese coast guard vessels. The same week, only hours after a top Chinese 
official denounced U.S. trade policy, three anonymous Chinese industry 
officials confirmed that some shipments of the same materials to the 
United States and Europe had been quietly halted as of 18 October.2 At a 
China-European Union business meeting in Brussels, Wen denied using 
rare earths as a political bargaining chip in either instance.3
Whatever intentions were behind these temporary export stoppages, the 
events of mid-October 2010 resulted in a flood of panicked analyses and 
demands for supply diversification despite the timely release of a year-
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long U.S. Department of Defense study which concluded that China's 
dominance in rare earths production does not pose a threat to the military 
supply chain which requires a relatively small amount of REEs to con-
tinue operating. Not to be upstaged, Republican U.S. Representative Mike 
Coffman slammed the report as "shortsighted," "myopic," and "certainly 
not looking at the economic security of the country."4 Since the military 
supply chain is only one of several important variables in evaluating the 
security implications of China's rare earths policy, it comes as no surprise 
that the Pentagon's apparent lack of concern was greeted with skepticism 
in many quarters.
East Asian state actors should not concern themselves with the influence 
of rare earths on military electronics procurement but rather with the 
potential for coercive use of rare earths during a strategic stand-off. 
China's rare earths embargo raises further questions as to the coercive 
utility of Chinese market power in other resource markets, particularly 
energy. Is China surreptitiously tying-up international supplies of key 
natural resources in preparation for some future diplomatic gambit? If 
not, could it do so in the future? The unyielding difficulty of discerning 
whether China's resource acquisitions and/or trade policy should be con-
ceptualized as geo-economic jujitsu or as legitimate products of economic 
growth is of further concern. Can China's intentions with respect to its 
resource diplomacy and trade policy be interpreted accurately? If so, what 
indicators might reliably differentiate development of coercive resource 
capabilities from run-of-the-mill economic competition?
On a theoretical level, analysis of PRC resource coercion has bearing on 
the concept of security dilemmas and may serve to broaden their analyti-
cal domain. Contemporary security dilemma scholarship focuses almost 
exclusively on hard-power variables such as weapons systems, doctrinal 
adjustments, and defense spending and their influence on regional mili-
tary insecurity.5 Economic perception and misperception have yet to be 
evaluated as contributors to regional security spirals. In light of this con-
ceptual gap, examination of China's resource diplomacy through lenses of 
perception and seems potentially fruitful.
The Modern Security Dilemma
The security dilemma is best expressed in two-stage form. The first stage 
of the security dilemma, the problem of interpretation, has its roots in the 
so-called "ambiguous symbolism" of strategic choice. The basic idea here 
is that any given choice can represent or symbolize a plurality of inten-
tions on the part of the deciding actor. The history of the Cold War offers 
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several excellent examples of this sort of ambiguity in the international 
security environment, perhaps the most well defined case being U.S. mis-
sile defense. The Reagan Administration's public justifications for invest-
ing in an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) umbrella emphasized the purely 
defensive nature of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and concor-
dantly peaceful American intentions.6 Despite these reassurances, some 
Soviet policymakers interpreted SDI as a policy of escalation.7 From the 
Soviet perspective, the shield's true purpose could be to free-up the 
United States' nuclear sword arm by nullifying the logic of mutually 
assured destruction. In this scenario, SDI functioned as an ambiguous 
symbol by eliciting multiple interpretations of its intentional underpin-
nings to different actors.
The second stage of the security dilemma, the problem of response, drives 
home the significance of ambiguous symbolism in international security. 
Under conditions of uncertainty, states do not have the luxury of reserv-
ing judgment on ambiguous security policies. As a result, decision-makers 
are always in danger of attributing false intentions to their strategic com-
petitors so long as their information is incomplete. Consider that, in the 
Cold War missile defense scenario, the Soviet Union could act rationally 
by augmenting its nuclear capabilities in response to perceived American 
belligerence, while still unnecessarily diminishing its own security by 
feeding mutual suspicion. The apparent contradiction comes in the form 
of a security spiral, with response and counterresponse destabilizing the 
strategic landscape as a result of misperception.
Generally speaking, the security dilemma is discussed almost exclusively 
with reference to arms races, deterrence relationships, and other tradi-
tional strategic studies issues. However, it stands to reason that given suf-
ficient securitization of a given non-military policy or issue area, security 
dilemmas could originate, or at the least derive momentum from, misper-
ception in security sectors traditionally ignored by military-strategic 
interpretations of international security. The ambiguity of China's 
resource policies could serve as a case study in this regard.
The Literature Gap
China's growing clout in international resource markets demands a 
systematic strategic response. Whatever its final form, the U.S. response 
will undoubtedly reflect some interpretation of the intentions underlying 
China's international economic behavior. The outcome of this process of 
interpretation and response will influence both the future of Sino-
American relations and the wider Asian security environment.
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Unfortunately, international relations and the East Asian security litera-
tures are essentially devoid of analysis of the potential for Chinese manip-
ulation of vital commodities as coercive devices. The literature is also 
virtually silent on what indicators the U.S. and its regional partners might 
use to establish whether or not ambiguous resource policies lie outside 
the norm of international economic conduct. As a result, we must turn to 
a synthesis of overlapping literatures in search of a way forward with 
respect to China's resource capabilities and potentialities.
As a starting point, exploration of China's resource diplomacy and its 
coercive possibilities can profitably be couched in terms of threat analysis. 
The severity of a threat is a function of the supposed antagonist's 
intentions and capabilities. In the context of Chinese resource coercion, 
the formulation above translates into two overarching questions that 
might be addressed or refined by related literature. First, under what 
circumstances would China utilize strategic resources as coercive 
instruments? Second, does China possess the objective capacity to 
develop such a coercive capability? Third, were it to succeed, under what 
circumstances would it be most effective? On the first question, recent 
decades have seen the publication of a vast body of research exploring 
China's foreign policy objectives and strategic culture. Extant literature 
also offers a well-developed picture of the structure and extent of China's 
resource diplomacy, while a relatively compact body of research in 
strategic studies suggests the possible uses and conditions for effective 
coercion in international politics. Having referenced these bodies of 
research, we can better proceed to unravel the riddle of Chinese resource 
coercion.
China's Resource Diplomacy and Coercion Theory
In recent years, China's resource diplomacy, that is the sum of its diplo-
matic, military, and economic efforts at gaining access to natural 
resources, has become a primary enabler of the coastal modernization 
effort at the heart of its national development strategy.8 The coastal strat-
egy has proven successful as the PRC continues to expand its strategic 
capabilities and appears poised to do so for the foreseeable future. The 
China literature is laden with data on China's breakneck economic 
growth. Since the early 1980s, China has enjoyed an average annualized 
growth rate of over eight percent of GDP with recent estimates suggesting 
that roughly one-quarter of world economic growth will belong to China 
in coming years. Furthermore, China's abnormally high national savings 
rate of more than forty percent indicates that much of China's consump-
tion potential has yet to be realized.9
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Despite this relatively cheery outlook, fueling the PRC's increasing eco-
nomic needs constitutes a thorny strategic problem for the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP). Sustaining the PRC's impressive economic 
momentum and enjoying its political dividends depends to a significant 
degree on China securing long-term access to key resource inputs, partic-
ularly energy. As a result, China's leadership has come to view resource 
security both as a national strategic priority, and an economic "soft rib."10
Strategic studies coercion literature further establishes exclusivity's rele-
vance to China's strategic intentions. Coercion is generally defined as con-
vincing an actor to choose to comply with a given demand by imposing or 
threatening to impose costs on undesirable courses of action, without 
resorting to brute force. Expanding on the work of Thomas Schelling in 
Arms and Influence, contemporary scholarship identifies two determi-
nants of successful coercion in the international arena: credibility, that is 
the degree to which the coercing actor can be expected to act on its threat, 
and persuasiveness, or the coercive intensity of the threat.11 In interna-
tional resource markets, whether or not China enjoys relative exclusivity 
over a vital international resource market has direct bearing on the poten-
tial persuasiveness of resource coercion. The credibility of a resource-
coercive strategy depends on the degree to which China perceives a threat 
to its vital interests.
The literature further suggests that independently adequate credibility or 
persuasiveness alone is not in itself a sufficient condition for coercive suc-
cess. States posing coercive threats with disproportionately low credibility 
and high persuasiveness, for example by threatening annexation as part 
of routine trade negotiations, cannot reasonably expect a positive 
response from their competitors.12 The outcome is similarly determinate 
for highly credible but insufficiently persuasive threats. Thus, in addition 
to exhibiting both credibility and persuasiveness, effective coercive strat-
egy is characterized by proportionality with what might be considered 
credible in light of the strategic prize.
China's Foreign Policy Objectives and Strategic 
Culture
With the rise of the PRC's third and fourth generation leaderships, under 
Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao respectively, China's foreign policy entered a 
period of transformation while maintaining its fundamental continuity 
with Deng Xiaoping's reformist vision.13 Recent decades have proven 
transformative insofar as China's present leadership is distinctly new. 
Even as of the Fifteenth National People's Congress in September 1997, of 
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the acting twenty-four member of the Chinese Politburo, only six had 
served in that body before 1992. In terms of regional origin, education, 
career path, military service, and foreign travel, the present leadership 
also contrasts sharply with its predecessors.14 Despite these divergences, 
China's new generation of leaders maintains and carries further many 
characteristics of China's traditional post-Mao foreign policies with 
respect to market reform and international engagement.15
In light of China's market-oriented ideological consensus, and the strong 
association of many contemporary Chinese leaders with China's coastal 
region, it is safe to assume that economic liberalization and development 
in the coastal provinces will remain the priority in China's overall national 
development strategy.16 The ultimate goal of the coastal strategy is mod-
ernization. In the sense used by PRC leadership, modernization does not 
pursue a future in which China will have caught up with the United States 
in technological, economic, or military terms. Instead, Chinese policy-
makers view modernization as a gradual assumption of China's rightful 
role as a great power.17 With this distinction in mind, it has been widely 
argued that China's modernization policy upholds three PRC core inter-
ests: the pursuit of "comprehensive national power," sovereignty, and 
regime maintenance.18
Studies of China's strategic culture suggest that PRC leadership is likely to 
use any means necessary to preserve the integrity of its central strategic 
objectives. Philosophically, China's strategic culture is a hybridization of 
Confucian and Realpolitik strands. Drawing from China's historically 
Confucian emphasis on social and economic harmony as guides for politi-
cal action, Chinese elites tend to believe their strategic culture is pacifist, 
non-expansionistic, anti-hegemonic, and defensive in orientation.19 Still, 
despite clear evidence to the contrary, China's foreign policy elites unerr-
ingly cast foreign policy decisions, up to and including the use of force, as 
essentially defensive in nature.20
Chinese commentators remain unfazed by the apparent contradiction 
between foreign perceptions and China's supposedly Confucian strategic 
culture. Mao is often cited as evidence of China's fundamentally defensive 
strategic mindset. In the words of China's late paramount leader: "We 
[China] do not desire one inch of foreign soil."21 Shoring up this popular 
sentiment, one Chinese analyst claims that: "The facts are: There are no 
records showing China's invasion of other countries or that China stations 
any soldiers abroad."22 With respect to the People's Liberation Army's 
(PLA) failed 1979 invasion of Vietnam and its 1962 border war with India, 
PRC strategists will generally invoke self-defense.
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The apparent lack of correspondence between China's perception of itself 
as essentially defensive and the historical record can be explained by Chi-
nese just war theory. According to a preponderance of Chinese strategic 
thinkers, the nature of a just war is simple: Just wars are wars of libera-
tion waged by the oppressed against the oppressor. From the perspective 
of CCP policy elites, China has long been a weak state surrounded by pow-
erful imperialists seeking to profit from China's internal problems.23 As a 
result, any war fought by China is by definition just so long as it continues 
to cast itself as downtrodden. This would include any war fought to 
"restore or protect national territory or to maintain national prestige."24 
This conclusion is cautionary insofar as it suggests that should China per-
ceive a threat to any of its core interests it would not abstain from the use 
of force, coercion, or other aggressive instruments of policy pursuant to 
"active defense" of its national interests.25
In sum, the literature on China's foreign policy orientation and strategic 
culture suggests that China would resort to using natural resources as 
coercive instruments under limited circumstances, namely: doing so 
would further any one of China's three core interests at an acceptable cost 
to any combination of the others, or doing so might, either in isolation or 
in concert with other vehicles of national power, insulate any combination 
of these interests from perceived foreign threats. The strategic-culture 
literature also suggests that Chinese foreign policy elites are unlikely to 
view coercive action in either case as aggressive, unnecessarily escalatory, 
or immoral because of these actions' targeting of encroaching foreign 
powers.
Resource Coercion and China's Rare Earths Industry
Exclusivity is very much a feature of China's power in the market for 
REEs. Furthermore, REE applications could hardly be more economically 
vital, as they are an integral component of "anything that has a motor or 
battery technology in it."26 With between ninety-five and ninety-seven 
percent of world production of these critical elements based in Chinese 
territory, the potential for geostrategic abuse of China's mineral wealth is 
very real. Coupled with the difficulty of penetrating China's decision-
making logic with respect to REEs, the situation also offers fertile ground 
for security spirals. China's questionable REE export cut-off following the 
detainment of the aforementioned Chinese ship captain has given rise to 
the worrying perception that China's REE objectives and motivation are 
more sinister than its quest for economic growth would suggest.
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Nevertheless, one need not doubt China's public justifications for REE 
export cuts. According to Keith Delaney, head of the Rare Earth Industry 
and Technology Association, "all the steps they've [China] taken make 
sense to manage their resource better."27 Delaney cites several plausible 
justifications for this view, namely that: (1) Smuggling of REEs in South 
China has worsened in recent years, (2) Pollution problems stemming 
from mining operations undermine Chinese efforts at environmental pro-
tection, and (3) sloppy processing techniques continue to result in tre-
mendous waste of valuable mineral resources. At the same time, China's 
deliberate structural transition away from primary sector exports towards 
value-added goods (finished, labor-intensive products) will likely see the 
PRC become a net importer of REEs by 2015.28 It seems that many (if not 
most) active participants in the rare earths market share this view.29 Dr. 
Stanley Trout, head of magnet manufacturing at the U.S. rare earths min-
ing firm Molycorp Minerals, generally supports this perspective, arguing 
that China views REEs in purely economic terms, with supply tensions 
being driven, at least in part, by the fact that "they've [China] always been 
looking for value added products." Dr. Trout interprets the fact that "their 
export quotas have been on the raw materials but not on the downstream 
products" as evidence of China's fundamental concern with attracting for-
eign investment.30 By cutting exports, China's economic planners encour-
age domestic production of high technology goods.
While it remains to be seen whether China's resource policies and natural 
resource endowment are at the point where they could constitute a signif-
icant security liability, in the opinion of several experts, China has unique 
and worrying advantages in the market for heavy rare earths (HREEs), 
particularly the magnet metals dysprosium and terbium. According to 
Jeff Green, owner of consultancy J.A. Green & Company and former Staff 
Director to the U.S. House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness, 
in the event of Chinese supply disruption "the world faces a real potential 
shortage of the heavy rare earths."31 Mr. Green, further argues that "the 
result is more important than the motivation" when discussing China's 
"ability to essentially remove these materials (REEs) from the supply 
chain," and "restrict Japans ability" to acquire them.32 United States Geo-
logical Survey Data, often cited by U.S. Government sources to downplay 
supply worries, actually supports this conclusion upon close examination, 
with a 2002 comparison of U.S. (Mountain Pass deposit) and south China 
REE deposits indicating near complete American dependence on Chinese 
sources of dysprosium, yttrium, and terbium.33 Molycorp's Mountain 
Pass deposit, the sole source of rare earths in the United States, offers no 
measurable quantities of either dysprosium or terbium, and only a small 
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quantity of yttrium. By comparison, China's southern Lateritic ore depos-
its offer relatively large quantities of yttrium, as well as economically sig-
nificant amounts of dysprosium and terbium.
Data pertaining to potential alternative REE sources reinforce Green's 
conclusion on the subject of China's REE exclusivity. There is little to no 
probability of getting alternative U.S. domestic REE sources, the situation 
with respect to HREEs is even bleaker in the event of a foreign policy cri-
sis. According to Green, "the rough rule of thumb is that it takes ten years 
to get a mine permitted in the United States."34 Even if extraordinary 
efforts were taken to expedite the permit process—whether they were to 
come in the form of public investment or outright nationalization—U.S. 
domestic REE deposits remain HREE poor and cannot be brought online 
without extensive and time consuming geological analysis.
The international supply situation is no more encouraging. In light of the 
paucity of HREE production outside of China the United States would 
find slim pickings in the event of a supply cut-off. As a result, with the vast 
majority of alternative international REE and HREE sources "already 
obligated to customers in Japan and around the world,"35 China has a 
unique opportunity to exert acute economic pressure on U.S., Japanese, 
or European interests in the context of a strategic showdown. Further-
more, CCP decisionmakers may find occasion to leverage their advantage 
in REE production in the event of another Taiwan or some other regional 
stand-off.
Of course, it might be objected that China only controls roughly one-third 
of known rare earths reserves, making the prospect of coercion unrealis-
tic.36 It seems clear, however, that current production, rather than aggre-
gate reserves, is the relevant strategic variable. Recall that untapped 
deposits of REEs cannot be brought online quickly; ten years is the aver-
age permitting time in the United States. It follows from this that REE 
importers such as the United States will have to live with a significant dis-
advantage in the rare earths market for the foreseeable future. As a result, 
the next ten years constitute a strategic window of opportunity for China 
to leverage its advantage in HREE production to strategic effect.
Even if the threat of Chinese natural resource coercion never materializes, 
the mere possibility will tend to intensify Sino-American strategic suspi-
cion. Many U.S. and Japanese commentators have already identified their 
economies' vulnerability to China's rare earths exports as strategically 
dangerous. If demand for rare earths continues along its presently expo-
nential trajectory, as it is likely to do, scarcity will almost certainly con-
tribute to a more volatile security climate as actors come to view rare 
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earths as increasingly valuable both economically and militarily. In order 
to avoid the costs of such a scenario, it will be crucial for the PRC to 
improve the transparency of its rare earths decision-making while clarify-
ing its intentions. In the near term, in order to mitigate risk, it would be 
advisable for large REE importers, such as the United States, as well as 
Taiwan and Japan, to consider building strategic reserves of key rare 
earths through foreign direct investment and the establishment of long-
term contracts with potential future suppliers of rare earths. Unfortu-
nately, this would only be possible through a sovereign wealth fund or 
similar institution the like of which the United States has little history 
operating.
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